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INVESTIGATING THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL REALM OF
BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY,
PART I: DOOYEWEERD ON REASON
Oliver Glanz
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Introducing the Article Series1
It has long been recognized that the field of  biblical theology has an 
enormous plurality of  competing and often mutually exclusive methodologies 
(e.g., literary, form, canon, structuralist, new, reader-response, sociopolitical, 
and depth-psychological criticisms),2 resulting in many different theologies.3 
Together with the often-lacking awareness of  the foundation of  one’s own 
methodological approach, this situation has complicated and politicized many 
dialogues. As a result, biblical theology, with its great methodological discord 
is, as such, becoming increasingly disreputable. Biblical theologians who 
take this diffuse methodological situation seriously and invest in theoretical 
thinking can be divided into two trends.
 Adherents of  the first trend seem to believe that the potential for 
developing completely new methodologies is exhausted. Here one either 
(a) discusses which methodologies should be ruled out or (b) accepts the 
intentionalities of  the different methodologies as justified but limited aspects 
of  biblical hermeneutics. As biblical hermeneutics is concerned with examining 
the relationship between the biblical text and its reader, it basically comprises 
1I want to thank especially Danielle Koning for helping me to polish my English 
and Sven Fockner who took the time to proofread my article. 
2See Steven McKenzie and Stephen Haynes, eds., To Each Its Own Meaning: 
An Introduction to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox, 1999); John Barton, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Manfred Oeming, Biblische hermeneutik: 
Eine Einführung (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998).
3Representative for the discipline of  biblical theology, Rainer Albertz describes 
the present situation in OT theology as follows: 
“Auffällig ist die verwirrende Vielfalt der über 20 Theologien, die seit 1933 
erschienen sind. Mag man dies noch als Ausdruck der Lebendigkeit der Disziplin 
werten, so muß doch nachdenklich stimmen, daß auch 60 Jahre, nachdem der erste 
Band der epochemachenden Theologie von Walther Eichrodt publiziert wurde, immer 
noch kein Konsens darüber ereicht werden konnte, wie die Aufgabe, der Aufbau und 
die Methode einer Theologie des Alte Testaments zu bestimmen sind. Im Gegenteil, 
die Divergenz der Ansätze hat sich in jüngster Zeit eher noch erhöht.
“Hinzu kommt eine verblüffende Gesprächsunfähigkeit zwischen den 
verschiedenen Entwürfen. Kaum ein Verfasser einer neuen Theologie geht auf  die 
vorangehenden ein, versucht, sie zu diskutieren, ihre Schwächen aufzudecken und zu 
einer nachweisbar besseren Lösung zu gelangen” (“Religionsgeschichte Israels statt 
Theologie des Alten Testaments!” in Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 10 [1995], 6).
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the effective aspect of  the author, the linguistic corpus, and the reader in the 
process of  understanding. For biblical scholars who accept the intentionalities 
of  different methodologies as justified, it is the different unbalanced emphases 
on hermeneutical aspects that underlie the methodological differences. 
This unbalanced treatment of  hermeneutical aspects causes author-, text-, 
and reader-oriented methodologies.4 Since the hermeneutical process of  
reading requires all three of  these foci for a proper understanding, multiple 
methodologies are accepted as legitimate if  their limited vantage point is 
recognized.5 Since the intentionalities of  the different methodologies are 
understood to represent the different possible, complementary, and necessary 
hermeneutical perspectives, methodological plurality is considered to be 
positive. This positive attitude, however, does not come without emphasizing 
the inherent limitations of  the individual methodologies and, therefore, their 
exclusivist claims are also critiqued.6 Hence, attempts are made to order them 
according to an appropriate procedural sequence.7
4Literary criticism, sociohistorical exegeses, historical psychology, and new 
archaeology are considered author-oriented approaches. Structuralism, new literary 
criticism, canonical criticism, and discourse analysis represent text-oriented approaches. 
Reader-response criticism, depth-psychological exegesis, liberation-theology exegesis, 
and feministic exegesis are considered reader-oriented.
5Eep Talstra does not agree “that adopting a new method implies that an earlier 
method has become superfluous” and thus states that “there is no need to present 
them in historical order” (“From The ‘Eclipse’ to the ‘Art’ of  Biblical Narrative: 
Reflections on Methods of  Biblical Exegesis,” in Perspectives in the Study of  the Old 
Testament and Early Judaism: A Symposium in Honour of  Adam S. van der Woude on the 
Occasion of  his 70th Birthday, ed. F. G. Martinez and E. Noort [Leiden: Brill, 2002], 5). 
The order that is suggested by Talstra is thus of  a procedural rather than a historical 
nature. To him, the methodological plurality is rooted in the plurality of  the reading 
process. Consequently, methodological pluralism does not need to be overcome, but 
only critically organized.
6Like Talstra and Manfred Oeming, Barton has worked on the allocation of  
the many methodologies within the hermeneutical process of  reading texts and (as 
a result) argues for the limitations of  each method. However, he does not develop 
an order of  methodologies. Similar to Barton, but with much more clarity, Oeming, 
175, stresses the need of  methodological plurality by quoting Merklein, “Die neueren 
Zugänge zur Bibel und die herkömmliche historische-kritische Exegese sind nicht als 
Alternative zu verstehen. Es handelt sich um unterschiedliche Fragestellungen, die 
sich in methodischer und hermeneutischer Hinsicht gegenseitig ergänzen. Wie die 
Verzahnung zu erfolgen hat, ist noch nicht abschließend geklärt.” Oeming predictably 
concludes: “Keine Methode kann mit Gründen exclusive monopolansprüche 
anmelden.”
7Epp Talstra suggests that, after having allocated the different methods with their 
aspects in the reading process, the theologian needs to start with the analysis of  the 
text. Here the analysis of  the text’s linguistic system is prior to the analysis of  the text’s 
rhetorical composition. The specific methods developed for linguistic and rhetorical 
criticism find their application in this first step (text-orientation). Second, the analysis 
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The second trend is represented by those biblical theologians who do not 
consider the different methods to be complementary. Adherents of  this trend, 
in their dissatisfaction with existing methodologies, see the need and possibility 
for further methodological development.8 The plurality of  methodologies is 
often not only problematic due to methodological incompatibility, but also 
because many methodologies are founded on a metaphysic that is foreign 
to the biblical testimony.9 The latter obstructs a satisfactory understanding 
of  the biblical text. Some scholars are therefore motivated to dispose of  the 
Greek-Occidental metaphysic that forms the presuppositional character of  
most theological methodologies.10 However, although the deconstruction of  
problematic metaphysical presuppositions is often made from a philosophical 
of  the author’s intention, i.e., the background to the text’s production and history, 
follows (author-orientation). Here the different historical-critical methodologies that 
focus on the author’s intention are applied in order to reconstruct the text and its textual 
tradition. The third step is focused on the reader and his position in being confronted 
by the text (reader-orientation). Here reader-response criticism and poststructuralist 
methodologies can be applied in order to help the single reader or religious community 
to become part of  the long hermeneutical tradition of  participating in the biblical 
testimony (“Texts and Their Readers: On Reading the Old Testament in Context of  
Theology,” in The Rediscovery of  the Hebrew Bible, ed. Janet Kyk et al. (Maastricht: Shaker, 
1999), 101-120; idem, “From the ‘Eclipse’ to the ‘Art’ of  Biblical Narrative,” 1-14; 
idem, Oude en Nieuwe Lezers: Een inleiding in de methoden van uitleg van het Oude Testament 
(Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok, 2002), 81-83, 97-120.
The practice of  ordering methods in terms of  procedure can also be found in 
Oeming’s work. However, he disagrees with the procedural order of  Talstra and starts 
with author-oriented methodologies (Oeming, 175-184).
8A variety of  thinkers could be mentioned here. After critically surveying the 
methodological scenery, Gerhard Hasel concludes “that a basically new approach 
must be worked out” (Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate [Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991], 194). The dissatisfaction about the methodological situation 
led Christof  Hardmeier to develop a text-pragmatic study of  literature (Erzähldiskurs 
und Redepragmatik im Alten Testament: unterwegs zu einer performativen Theologie der Bibel 
[Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005]). Contrary to Hardmeier, Rainer Albertz distances 
himself  from methods that focus on the establishing of  an OT theology by arguing 
for a history-of-religions approach (A History of  Israelite Religion in the Old Testament 
Period [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1999]).
9E.g., the “loss of  the author” within structuralistic methods could be 
mentioned.
10A good example is Christof  Hardmeier, who tries to dissociate from the classical 
idea of  “theology” as the designation of  doctrinal display of  the Christian credence. 
In contrast to “theology,” he develops the idea of  “theo-logy,” in order to focus on the 
biblical text as “speaking about and speaking of  God” (“Systematische Elemente der 
Theo-logie in der Hebräischen Bibel: Das Loben Gottes—ein Kristallisationsmoment 
biblischer Theo-logie,” in Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 10 (1995) in Erzähldiskurs 
und Redepragmatik im Alten Testament. Unterwegs zu einer performativen Theologie, FAT 46 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), S. 339-354.
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perspective, the construction of  new methodologies seems to lack a newly 
developed basic metaphysical conception.
The two trends share a commonality in that they critically study the 
methodological situation and its hermeneutical backgrounds. This attitude is 
obligatory for any biblical theologian who desires to find a reasonable way to 
understand Scripture and who desires to be faithful to the discovery of  truth. 
The present unsatisfactory situation of  methodological plurality demands a 
thorough investigation of  its very foundations in order to choose or develop 
one’s own working methodology. Within Seventh-day Adventism, Gerhard 
Hasel has pioneered the critical investigation of  methodologies used in 
exegesis and biblical theology.11
However, aside from praising both trends for their critical stance, I see a 
problem in their procedure. In order to better understand this problem, it is 
helpful to examine methodology from the perspective of  the human act of  
interpretation. Fernando Canale explains that the human act of  interpretation 
“moves from the subject that interprets to the issue or thing that is interpreted. 
The human act of  interpretation, then, has a beginning, a movement, and an 
end. The end is the issue (object) interpretation seeks to understand. The 
movement is the process through which we interpret the issues. The beginning 
includes the thing (reality) and the perspective (presuppositions) from which 
we start the interpretative act.”12
The problem, then, in the usual procedure of  examining methodologies, is 
that methodologies are primarily judged in terms of  functionality, focusing on 
what a specific methodology claims and is able to perform. The present debate, 
therefore, especially focuses on the methodological aspect of  movement, i.e., 
on the procedure or functionality of  a specific methodology. It loses sight 
of  the importance to critically investigate methodological presuppositions, 
i.e., starting points. Generally, the application of  functionalistic criteria does 
not take place in ignorance of  philosophical presuppositions. The point is, 
however, that these presuppositions are not deeply examined.13 James Barr 
stresses this observation in his critique on classical historical criticism by saying 
that “To this day there does not exist any really clear and philosophically valid 
11See Hasel, Old Testament Theology; and idem, New Testament Theology: Basic Issues in 
the Current Debate (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).
12Fernando Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical 
Understanding of  the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of  Theology?” JATS 12/2 
(2001): 20.
13E.g., Hasel has given an insightful critical analysis of  the methodological 
plurality within biblical theology in his Old Testament Theology. However, although 
he engages the crucial issue within the debate of  his time by pointing out that “the 
distinction between what a text meant and what a text means is at the core of  the 
most fundamental problem of  OT theology” (30), he still remains on the level of  
functionality and procedure. Although he recognizes the philosophical dimension that 
lies behind the “what it meant” and “what it means” problematic, he does not involve 
himself  in a critical philosophical examination.
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account of  what traditional biblical criticism was doing!”14 In his sensitivity 
to the situation, John Barton is aware of  this imbalance. He explains that 
the core problem of  methodological plurality will not be exhaustively tackled 
by a mere comparison of  the functionality and knowledge-generating ability 
of  methodologies. Barton asks for a thorough examination of  the role of  
method as such.15 This conclusion targets the epistemological foundations 
of  methodology, which Barton describes as the “metacritical” issue that 
demands proper and specifically philosophical analysis.16 However, like many 
other critical thinkers, Barton himself  does not attempt to investigate the 
presuppositional level, as he does not consider himself  to be an expert in the 
field of  philosophy.17
Thus, on one hand, there is a general awareness by critics of  
methodological plurality, that methodology cannot be reduced to procedures 
that help one to arrive at an understanding of  the specific objects in focus 
(e.g., the biblical text); rather it also includes philosophical presuppositions. 
However, on the other hand, the main focus in the evaluation of  methods 
still remains on the practical ability of  methodologies to deliver justified 
and relevant result, i.e., they remain procedure oriented. An examination in 
terms of  functionality helps to grasp the consequences, i.e., the results or 
ends of  specific methodologies for biblical exegesis. It does not go to the 
theoretical core of  the problem, but remains on the surface level of  practice. 
14James Barr, “The Synchronic, the Diachronic and the Historical: A Triangular 
Relationship?” in Synchronic or Diachronic? A Debate on Method in Old Testament Exegesis, 
ed. Johannes C. de Moor (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 9.
15John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 1996), 4.
16Ibid.
17The result is that Barton critiques the different methodologies in regard to their 
applicational shortcomings and limitations. Contrary to Hasel, he does not eventually 
make a proposal for a basically new approach in methodology, but rather argues 
against the pursuit of  a “correct” methodology, although he has not investigated 
the metacritical issue that he considers to be the root of  the entire problem (Reading 
the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Study [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
1996], 237). Consequently, Barton’s suggestion, 246, is dissatisfying, hinting that the 
diversity of  methods will only become a problem when a single method is perceived 
to be “correct,” i.e., the only way of  approaching the human act of  reading and 
understanding a text. Thus, the absolutization and exclusivity of  a specific method is 
considered problematic, not the methods as part of  a hermeneutical whole. If  the latter 
would be critically analyzed, much more far-reaching and promising methodological 
considerations could be developed, as Klaus Berger states for the biblical historicist 
“Die Konsequenzen dieser Selbstbesinnung [Berger refers to the critical metaphysical 
reflection] des historikers auf  seine eigenen Möglichkeiten könnten erheblich sein, 
insbesondere angesichts der häufig zu konstatierenden Überfremdung der Historie 
durch Metaphysik aufgrund mangelnder Lust oder Bereitschaft der Historiker, sich auf  
systematische Erwägungen einzulassen” (Hermeneutik des Neuen Testaments [Tübingen: 
A. Franke, 1999], 63). 
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Our situation within biblical theology is, however, far too serious for limiting 
our critical attitude to the watchword “whatever works is fine for me.”
Although we appreciate the efforts taken to critically examine the 
problematic pluralistic methodological situation, we need to look for new 
criteria that are able to examine not only the ends of  methods, but their 
beginnings. An analytical frame needs to be developed that goes beyond a 
critical reflection on the pragmatic efficiency of  methodologies to their very 
foundation. Any methodology is undergirded by a specific concept of  human 
cognition (epistemology).18 Thus if  we really want to understand methodology 
in general and our present situation in particular, we need to come to grips 
with the structure of  epistemology and its ontological foundation.19 Through 
such a framework, both beginning and end, i.e., presuppositional starting 
points and theological consequences, can be critically examined.
The current methodological debate within biblical theology has been 
especially kindled through the conflict between the students of  the history-of-
religions approach (Lemche, Thompson, Albertz, Davies) and the adherents of  
the classical approach to OT theology.20 Joachim Schaper’s latest contribution 
to this debate comes to the same conclusion that I am suggesting.21 He reasons 
that it is because of  the unawareness of  the epistemological foundation 
of  science that some thinkers create the impression of  being naïve and 
ignorant.22 According to Schaper, and I wholeheartedly agree, a reflection on 
18Any research methodology implies an understanding of  how one can come to 
true knowledge. Therefore, a concept of  the process of  cognition and knowledge in 
general is a precondition for any methodology.
19Any concept of  human cognition already assumes a general understanding of  
what can and cannot be known. Hence there is no concept of  the epistemic (specific 
epistemology) without a concept of  the ontic (specific ontology). On the other 
hand, a concept of  the ontic is dependent on the very process of  cognition and the 
understanding thereof. Ontology and epistemology, then, are independent.
20See the debate in Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 10 (1995), and in the latest critical 
contention of  Jens Kofoed, Text and History: Historiography and the Study of  the Biblical 
Text (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2005).
21Joachim Schaper, “Auf  der Suche nach dem alten Israel? Text, Artefakt um 
‘Geschichte Israels’ in der alttestamentlichen Wissenschaft vor dem hintergrund 
der Methodendiskussion in den Historischen Kulturwissenschaften Teil I, II” ZAW 
118/1, 2 (2006): 181-196.
22Schaper, 8, writes, “Aus den Äußerungen Lemches, seines Kopenhagener und 
seines Sheffielder Kollegen sprechen eine bemerkenswerte Naivität und eine geradezu 
atemberaubende Unkenntnis der epistemologischen Problematik.” He, 10, also states 
that the contributions of  the history-of-religions approach are “erkenntnischtheoretisch 
völlig haltlos, einerseits in ihren naiven Forderungen nach ‘Tatsachen’ und ‘Beweisen’ 
einem spätestens seit Droysen obsoleten Vulgär-Rankeanismus huldigen und 
andererseits in der Art ihrer grundsätzlichen Infragestellung aller bisherigen historisch-
philologischen Exegeses des Alten Testamentes als ‘tendenziöse Rekonstruktion einer 
fiktiven Vergangenheit, die fundamentalistischen Absichten dient.’”
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the epistemological foundation of  science is needed if  any further debate is 
to remain fruitful and if  a solution to the current methodological crises in 
biblical theology is to be found.23 Schaper, an OT theologian, shows how OT 
theology in general creates the impression that it has not yet reflected on the 
epistemological understanding of  Max Weber.24 He further shows how the 
history-of-religions approach is breathtakingly ignorant of  the epistemological 
problem.25 Schaper argues that serious biblical theologians can no longer work 
on the basis of  the Rankian positivism, but need to acknowledge the shift 
toward the “autogenesis of  cognitive reality” initiated by Heinrich Rickert and 
Max Weber. The idea of  the “autogenesis of  cognitive reality” supposes that 
the criteria for truth need to be sought within the logical realm of  the subject 
and not within the material realm of  the object, which is never accessible as 
Ding an sich. This shift automatically generates a change in the understanding 
and meaning of  historical facts, ancient texts, and archaeological artifacts as 
objects of  scientific research.26
Although Schaper concludes that epistemological reflection is necessary 
for a reorientation in the field of  OT studies, he is surprisingly uncritical 
of  the Kantian idea of  a “universal logic of  science” (universal gültige Logik 
der Forschung).27 This is astonishing since the ontological foundation of  the 
Kantian idea of  the universality of  the subject’s logic has been convincingly 
critiqued within postmodern philosophy. The latter has shown that science 
can no longer “rest on the absolute, unmovable ground of  human reason, but 
on the hypothetical foundation of  human imagination.”28
However, we see how Schaper shifts the basic issue in the current debate 
from the text-oriented “material” or procedural questions to the call for a 
proper understanding of  the formal structure of  human reasoning. We can 
consequently conclude that the debate about the problematic diversity of  
methodologies is no longer limited to discussing procedures of  method that 
do not seem to do justice to the biblical text, its authors, and its readers, 
but points beyond procedure to the understanding of  human reasoning 
23Schaper, 5, formulates the need “das eigene Vorgehen auf  der Höhe des 
geschichtstheoretischen Erkenntnisstandes epistemologisch zu reflektieren.”
24See Max Weber, “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer 
Erkenntnis,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftlehre, ed. Johannes Winkelmann 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1982), 146-214. For a short introduction to Weber’s 
methodological understanding of  science of  culture and history, see Friedrich Jäger 
and Jörn Rüsen, Geschichte des Historismus: Eine Einführung (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 
1992), 156-160.
25Ibid., 8.
26Ibid., 8-9.
27Ibid., 9, 11.
28Fernando Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive Foundations 
of  Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham: University Press of  America, 2001), 
9.
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(epistemology) that methodological procedures necessarily assume.29 Thus 
the call for an examination of  the epistemological ground of  biblical studies 
increases in volume.30
So far, the need and duty of  the biblical theologian and science to 
understand the epistemological foundation of  methodologies and critically 
develop his or her own understanding in this matter is introduced. My goal 
in this series of  articles is to contribute to critical and analytical thinking in 
order to stimulate further methodological deconstruction and development. In 
the first two articles, I will introduce the ground-breaking work of  the Dutch 
Reformed Christian philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (current article) and the 
Argentinean Christian philosopher and theologian Fernando Canale (second 
article) in regard to their respective structures and interpretations of  human 
understanding from a radical Christian perspective.31 Their pioneering work, in 
which they critically analyze the widely held claim of  the neutrality of  human 
29Since epistemology lies at the foundation of  any science, an understanding of  
epistemology in general and the development of  one’s own epistemology in particular 
will be most fruitful for both the inner theological debate and the encounter and debate 
with any other science. It is not only in the realm of  theology in general and biblical 
theology in particular that a problematic methodological plurality is found. In every 
scientific activity, whether in the humanities or natural sciences, we encounter the same 
problematic (Roy Clouser, The Myth of  Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of  
Religious Belief  in Theories [Notre Dame: University of  Notre Dame Press, 2005]). The 
lively debate within the field of  linguistics among cognitive, generative, and functionalistic 
linguists is a good example of  this reality. However, although the situation is different 
within theology, linguists recognized much earlier both the impact of  epistemological 
conceptions and critically investigated them in order to uncover the origin of  competing 
linguistic theories (cf. William Foley, Anthropological Linguistics: An Introduction [Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997], 81-245; George Lakoff  and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The 
Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought [New York: Basic, 1999]).
30Besides Schaper, Kofoed, 247, should also be mentioned. In his latest extensive 
analysis of  the methodology of  the Albertz-Lemche-Thomson-Davies school, he 
stresses that “matter of  method and presuppositions have been largely overlooked 
in the debate over the epistemological and historiographical value of  biblical texts.” 
However, we need to acknowledge that a critical analysis of  the philosophical 
presuppositions involved is only one part of  the story. Critical analyses of  procedures 
and characteristics of  data (object; e.g., Bible) are needed as well. Consequently, a 
critical assessment of  the methodological analysis needs to include three aspects: man 
as subject with his presuppositional contribution, the characteristic of  the data to 
be researched as object, and the methodological strategy as procedure for gaining 
understanding about the data.
31I will primarily follow Herman Dooyeweerd’s thought as presented in his 
magnus opus (A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, vols. 1 and 2 [Lewiston: Mellen, 
1997]). The basis for the presentation of  Fernando Canale’s line of  thinking will 
be his dissertation, A Criticism of  Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial 
Presuppositions, Andrews University Dissertation Series (Berrien Springs: Andrews 
University Press, 1987).
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reasoning, responds to the present call for epistemological reflection, putting 
them ahead of  their times. In a unique and intriguing way, Dooyeweerd and 
Canale involve themselves in a philosophical analysis of  the structure of  human 
understanding by which they are able to develop an analytical framework for 
deconstructing methodologies. It is this kind of  analysis and framework that 
is demanded if  we want to arrive at clarity for our methodological struggles. 
In the third article, I will first show how Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s critical 
analyses of  human understanding can be utilized to investigate the ontological 
foundations of  specific methodologies. Then I will explicate the differences 
between Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s thinking (through comparison). In the last 
article, I will attempt to critique Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s analyses in order to 
prepare the work of  transformation and further development. In this last step, 
I hope to suggest epistemological criteria that can enrich the framework of  
critical reflection on methodologies, their nature, and their impacts. Since all the 
articles will draw heavily on my philosophical research at the Vrije Universiteit 
Amsterdam, I will often refer to that research.
My general expectation is that, by means of  this series of  articles, the 
reader might become more sensitive and critical to the realm of  methodologies 
and realize that a reflection on biblical epistemology and ontology is not only 
fruitful for biblical theology, but for all scientific disciplines. Specifically, 
I expect that these articles will support the reader in reinterpreting the 
hermeneutical relation between author/event, text/artifact, and interpreter 
from the perspective of  a biblical understanding of  epistemology and ontology. 
This calls for the reader to involve himself  or herself  with constructing a 
biblical perspective on historical progression that integrates both normativity 
and subjectivity. The latter will enable a careful thinker to have a fresh look at 
the diversity of  biblical-text tradition as well as the inner textual diversity of  
the biblical testimony.
* * * * * * * * *
Part I/IV: Dooyeweerd on Reason
1.1 Introduction to Dooyweerd’s Thought
It is widely held that rational thinking and its application in science and 
philosophy as theoretical thinking is neutral. It is this belief  that is the 
foundation of  many philosophical traditions and sciences, and even functions 
as a legitimatization and justification for the reliability of  the latter. At the 
foundation of  the claim that rational thinking is neutral lies the assumption 
that rational thinking is autonomous.32 The central unity that the many 
different philosophical schools experience in their general assumption 
32Autonomy is the presupposition for neutrality. This is because autonomy includes 
the idea of  practical or material independence, i.e., self-sufficiency. Consequently, 
something which proposes to be autonomous cannot be influenced or determined in 
its being by something or someone else since the power of  determination is of  and 
in itself. If  reason is considered to be neutral and as having the potential of  “pure 
judgments,” it is claiming an autonomous status.
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about the neutrality of  rational thought, however, stands in tension with 
the diversity of  fundamental conceptions of  the autonomy of  rational and 
theoretical thought.33 Unity is experienced in the claim that rational thought 
is autonomous, but not in the argumentation for the autonomy of  rational 
thought. In the field of  science and philosophy, the rationality of  thought 
finds its most abstract application in theoretical thinking. If  there is no 
unifying idea about the nature of  theoretical thought, how can one claim 
unity in the idea of  the neutrality and autonomy of  theoretical thought and 
claim that science is neutral? How can one claim the autonomy of  reason if  
there is not even an agreement about what reason is?
Behind this problem lies the answer of  why, perhaps, the philosophical 
discourse of  the twentieth century became increasingly a discourse of  
misunderstanding, unable to beget mutual apprehension among different 
philosophical schools. The doubt about the pretentious claim of  neutrality 
of  theoretical thought even increases when one considers the results and 
conclusions of  depth psychology and existentialism, which show that in 
matters of  truth, human reason cannot function as ultimate judge.34
This background urges any thinker to examine the deeper reason why 
there are so many conceptions about the nature of  the autonomy of  reason 
and what role and determining influence different presuppositions play in 
the formulation of  a conception of  reason. Dooyeweerd was motivated 
to inquire into the universal inner structure of  theoretical thought itself. 
An understanding of  the universal inner structure of  theoretical thought 
promises the possibility for understanding the origin of  the different 
philosophical conceptions of  reason and their claim of  the autonomy of  
reason. In addition, it might help the diligent thinker to grasp the underlying 
problems that are involved in philosophical discourse and provide answers 
about whether theoretical thought is really neutral.
The analysis of  the universal structure of  theoretical thought goes 
beyond an immanent analysis that looks for the inner logical consistency of  
any concept about reason. Such an analysis will even go beyond a transcendent 
analysis of  reason that investigates the differences between existing 
conceptions. “Transcendental,” here understood as a technical term, refers to 
the formal conditions that are needed in order to allow for the acquisition of  
philosophical and theoretical knowledge.35 That is why Dooyeweerd calls his 
33Cf. Yong Joon Choi, Dialog and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance 
of  Herman Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique, Hermit Kingdom Studies in History and 
Religion (Cheltenham, PA: Hermit Kingdom, 2006), 76.
34Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended 
Autonomy of  Philosophical Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1960), 2.
35The term “transcendental” is taken from Kant’s philosophy, but receives a 
radical new interpretation that assumes a creational ontic order and that functions as 
the condition for our thinking (René van Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” in 
Kennis en werkelijkheid, Tweede inleiding tot een christelikjke filosofie [Amsterdam: Buijten & 
Schipperheijn, 1996], 62-69; L. Kalsbeek, Bernard Zylstra, and Josina Van Nuis Zylstra, 
Contours of  a Christian Philosophy: An Introduction to Herman Dooyeweerd’s Thought: A Supplement 
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analysis of  the structure of  theoretical thought a transcendental critique since 
it inquires into the “universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical 
thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure of  
this thought itself.”36 An analysis of  the universal structure of  reason will 
consequently be of  transcendental character since it goes beyond the dogmatic 
examination of  conceptions into the analysis of  the structural realities. These 
realities are involved in any formulation of  any theoretical conception. Only a 
critique that transcends any transcendent and immanent critique to become a 
transcendental critique will be able to critically inquire into the dogma of  the 
autonomy of  theoretical thought. We will see that through its ambition the 
transcendental critique receives a strong hermeneutical character.
The supposition that theoretical thinking is not neutral is based on the 
tension between the common claim of  the autonomy of  reason and the different 
contradicting conceptions of  it. This supposition, along with the insights of  
depth psychology and existentialistic philosophy, shows that Dooyeweerd’s call 
for a transcendental critique is justified. The conclusion of  his inquiry into the 
universal inner structure of  theoretical thought shows that the dogma of  the 
autonomy of  theoretical thought, whether found in philosophy or science, can 
no longer be upheld. According to Dooyeweerd, the structure of  reason itself  
shows that theoretical thinking is in need of  a religious choice that cannot be 
found in reason itself, but necessarily transcends it.37
Dooyeweerd developed two analyses of  the inner nature of  theoretical 
thought—the first and second ways, which can be understood as two 
different possible routes for a transcendental critique. Both ways are built 
upon Dooyeweerd’s modal theory. Thereafter I will focus on the second 
way, as it draws more strongly on the modal theory and represents the later 
Dooyeweerd, which I am here focusing on.38 Because of  the dependent 
relation between the transcendental critique and the modal theory, I will first 
give a short explanation of  Dooyeweerd’s modal theory before I describe his 
second way of  analyzing the structure of  theoretical thought.
1.2 Model Theory: On the Plurality of  Being
1.2.1 Interpretational Choice and Universal Structural Data
Within the history of  philosophy, the interpretations of  the nature of  
empirical data in temporal reality can roughly be categorized into two opposing 
perspectives. The first perspective, taken in its extreme form, constitutes 
to the Collected Works of  Herman Dooyeweerd [Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 2002], 172-174).
36Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 1: 37.
37Choi, 52-53.
38For the first way, see Oliver Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A 
Limited Comparison, Critical Assessment, and Further Development of  Herman 
Dooyeweerd’s Structural Analysis of  Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale’s 
Phenomenological Analysis of  the Structure of  Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation” 
(M. A. Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2006), 32-38.
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the notion that the idea a person has when he or she experiences a thing 
(e.g., an event, an object, a living being) is the representation of  the thing 
in itself. Human beings, therefore, have an objective understanding of  the 
thing outside themselves. The second perspective, taken in its extreme form, 
constitutes the notion that the idea a person has when he or she experiences a 
thing is a representation of  his or her (mental) creation of  the thing he or she 
is experiencing. Human beings, therefore, have only subjective access to the 
thing outside themselves and can never know what is really external to their 
own subjective state. In this rather complex age-old and ongoing dilemma 
between the subjective and the objective perspective, Dooyeweerd wants 
to formulate an interpretation of  the nature of  empirical data in temporal 
reality by adopting a radical Christian starting point rather than joining either 
the subjective or the objective perspectives. In this way, his modal theory 
is nothing other than an interpretative analysis of  the universally shared 
experience of  temporal reality.39
According to Dooyeweerd, the naïve experience of  temporal reality 
with all its diversities can only be interpreted correctly when one takes the 
sovereignty of  God as the creator of  reality (i.e., both of  the thinking human 
being and his or her object of  thought and experience) as the ultimate starting 
point for one’s interpretation. Only when this starting point is taken, will 
one be able to do justice to the experienced datum that is present to anyone 
irrespective of  his or her religious faith and philosophical frameworks. 
Although interpretation can take place only when one chooses a starting 
point or basic paradigm of  interpretation, critical inspection takes place by 
comparing the interpretational concept with the experienced datum.
Being aware of  the different routes that interpretation (from a starting 
point as interpretational framework and the experienced datum toward a 
formulation of  a concept of  temporal reality) and critical inspection (from 
experienced datum towards the formulated concept of  it) take, Dooyeweerd 
stresses that one cannot arrive at the same interpretation and analytical 
conclusion if  one does not share his starting point. Thus, seen from the 
direction of  the rational activity of  interpretation, the construction of  his 
interpretation of  temporal reality is impossible if  one does not accept the 
biblical God as being the creator of  temporal reality.40 However, seen from 
the direction of  the rational activity of  critical inspection, verification by 
thinkers who do not share his interpretational starting point is possible. Such 
a verification process can take place on the basis of  empirical data (as state of  
affairs) and his many philosophical arguments, which stay strong even without 
his interpretational starting point. Consequently, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy 
39For Dooyeweerd, temporal reality is the naïvely experienced everyday reality. 
However, temporal reality is not the only realm of  creation. He also knows of  the 
created supratemporal self, which will be introduced in the course of  this article. Here 
“temporal” refers to reality whenever the daily experienced reality is meant.
40Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 53.
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can have a persuasive impact on those who do not share the same religious 
choice.41
1.2.2 Interpretation of  Naïve Experience
To avoid misunderstanding Dooyeweerd, it is important to see that the 
structural datum he is speaking of  does not represent an ontology; rather, it 
refers to the empirical data of  experienced temporal reality.42 The structural 
datum that represents the reference for the justification of  philosophical 
conceptions is the human experience of  temporal reality. This experience is a 
universal datum that is independent of  ontological conceptions. It is the task 
of  philosophy to find conceptions and interpretations of  the structural datum 
that can be justified by the experience of  temporal reality. The structural 
datum then functions as the central focus of  theoretical conceptualization 
and as the background for any critical assessment of  theoretical concepts.
In order to introduce the modal theory as an attempt to interpret reality 
as structural datum, I would like to describe two characteristics of  human 
experience as datum: naïve experience and experience of  scientific analogies.
Rene van Woudenberg provides examples of  structural datum that show 
that the diversity of  experience of  a particular thing among different persons 
raises the question of  the origin of  this diversity.43 His example demonstrates 
how diverse the experiences of  the same concert can be among different 
persons: This is not worth the money! What a scratching of  horse hairs 
on cat’s bowels! What an uplifting social atmosphere! What a pure music! 
These various opinions about the same experience reveal differing economic, 
biological, social, or aesthetic perspectives.
How, then, is it possible that the same thing is experienced in such a 
variety of  ways? Further, how is it possible that everyone understands what 
is meant by the diverse expressions of  others and relates it to the same event 
they themselves have described differently? As referred to at the beginning 
of  1.2.1, there are, in principle, two different answers given within the history 
of  philosophy: the concept of  the thing in focus is either the projection of  
the subject on the object, or it is the projection of  the object on the subject. 
In some strands of  postmodern philosophy, the latter opinion can no longer 
be taken very seriously since it is difficult to explain that the object projects 
different impressions on the different subjects unless one allows for the 
determinative nature of  the subject’s interpretational framework itself.44 
Dooyeweerd’s approach to this question is different since he can see that all 
the different expressions relate to the different modes of  being inherent to 
anything that is experienced and observed.
41Ibid., 57-58.
42Choi, 61.
43René van Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken: inleiding Tot Een Christelijke Filosofie, 
Verantwoording (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 2004), 66-70.
44Alvin Plantinga, On Christian Scholarship (http://www.calvin.edu/academic/
philosophy/ virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/on_christian_scholarship.pdf).
18 Seminary StudieS 47 (SprinG 2009)
All things exist by a multitude of  modes and express several aspects of  
their being simultaneously. The economic, biological, social, and aesthetic 
perspectives that were chosen by the people in our example refer to the 
different modes of  concert-being. The different emphasis that is brought in 
through the subject’s side reveals both the diversity of  the observed thing and 
the aspectual perspective the subject chooses while describing the experienced 
thing. Thus both the object and the subject contribute to the interpretation of  
the structural datum. Such a modal interpretation helps to do justice to two 
moments of  the structural datum. First, it explains why in our naiveté we feel 
that we have not understood the phenomenon of  a thing fully by interpreting 
it from a certain modal perspective (the concert seems to have more functions 
than just a biological function). Second, it explains why people who have 
different expressions about the same thing can still understand each other and 
know what the expressions refer to.
The diversity of  expression, then, can often find its background in the 
individual focus on a specific mode of  a thing’s being—a mode that anyone 
can recognize and talk about, although their subjectively chosen focus might be 
different. Thus, for example, a concert can be understood not only economically 
(and thus cannot be reduced to the economical perspective alone), but also 
reveals many other aspects. This is why a diversity of  expressions about the 
same thing does not hinder communication about the thing, thereby making 
mutual understanding possible. In a certain way, then, diversity is inherent to 
the things themselves, independent of  their observers.
The second characteristic of  human experience concerns the scientific 
realm of  human activity. From the scientific perspective, there is a drive to 
discover, through the application of  a certain discipline, specific processes 
and laws. The results of  this drive can be seen in the formulation of  analogies. 
In biology, for example, the principle of  “life” as the struggle for survival is 
applied to all of  reality. Consequentially, all aspects of  reality (e.g., religion, 
business, society, or morality) are understood to be a part and expression 
of  the biological struggle to survive. The analogies of  the biological aspect 
find themselves in words such as “religious life,” “business life,” “social life,” 
and “moral life.” The analogies of  the psychic aspect find themselves in 
formulations such as feeling “for logical coherence, cultural feeling, linguistic 
feeling, aesthetic feeling, legal feeling, moral feeling.”45
These analogies can tempt a scientist to place the origin of  religion, 
business, society, or morality within the basic biological life-death struggle. 
This drive to understand all of  reality through discovered principles, laws, 
and processes of  a specific science shows that it is difficult to reduce any 
science to another since the reduced science (e.g., neuron-physics reduces 
psychology to a subcategory of  neuron-physics) can also reduce any science 
to its own subcategory. Where such a reduction through the absolutization of  
one’s scientific discipline takes place, we speak of  the phenomenon of  “isms” 
(e.g., biologism, physicalism, psychologism).
45Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 10-11.
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Because Doooyeweerd interprets the structural data of  the temporal 
horizon of  reality from his Christian starting point, he cannot allow any part 
of  creation to become the originator of  any other part. Therefore, he does 
not allow the absolutization of  any aspect of  reality or scientific discipline, but 
instead interprets the existence of  a diversity of  sciences. Further, he allows 
for the fact that the absolutistic attempts of  any science, together with the 
diversity of  naïve experience, does not hinder interpersonal communication, 
but actually hints toward the modal diversity of  reality itself. Thus he can 
philosophically justify and support the existing diversity of  scientific 
disciplines since different irreducible perspectives on reality are possible due 
to the multimodality of  being.
As science has shown, there are laws and norms within reality that have a 
structural nature and which belong to reality itself. Since there are irreducible 
perspectives to reality, we relate the different modal laws not hierarchically but 
horizontally to each other. The laws of  the psychic aspect of  things cannot 
be explained by and do not originate from the biological-aspectual laws. 
Although one aspect is related to the other and necessarily dependent on the 
other modalities, this relation is not of  a causal character.46 The laws of  one 
modal aspect cannot explain the laws of  the other modal aspects, although 
mutual influence takes place in the sense that one modal aspect is present 
within any other modal aspect in an analogical sense.
1.2.3 Being as Temporal Being
Besides the fact that the structural data show that different expressions 
by different people about the same thing are possible without hindering 
communication and understanding, they also show that a person can decide 
to have different perspectives about something without experiencing a 
fragmentation of  that thing. Thus, although different perspectives can be 
chosen, the structural datum always expresses coherence and unity. This is 
why it makes sense that Dooyeweerd describes the structural datum, which 
consists of  a diversity of  modal aspects, as a diversity of  coherence rather 
than an antithetical diversity. The many modal ways in which we experience 
reality (ervaringswijzen, manners of  experience) are of  a coherent character 
pointing to a central unity. Therefore, the economic and aesthetic aspects of  
a concert are not experienced as contradicting or antithetical, but as integral 
parts of  the concert.
Due to his Calvinistic viewpoint that accepts God’s essential being as 
timeless47 and his creation as temporal, Dooyeweerd concludes that time is 
the common factor of  all modal aspects and that through time all aspects are 
bound into an inner coherence as indissoluble interrelations.48 Cosmic time, as 
46Herman Dooyeweerd, “Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” 
Philosophia reformata: orgaan van de Vereeniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte 5 (1940): 200.
47On the difference between Dooyeweerd’s understanding of  timelessness and 
the Greek understanding of  timelessness, see note in Glanz, 16, n. 20.
48Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: 
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created temporality, holds all modal aspects of  reality together and guarantees 
the naïve experience of  inner coherence of  any particular thing and reality 
in general. Because of  this temporal coherence between different modalities, 
analogical relations within the different scientific disciplines are possible from 
the perspective of  any modal aspect (e.g., the analogical moments of  the 
biological aspect of  being find their expression in, for example, the economic, 
religious, moral, or inner life).49 The reason for the coherence-function of  
time can only be understood when we see that Dooyeweerd interprets the 
different aspects of  being as aspects of  cosmic time or time-modalities. Time 
is, therefore, experienced in its diversity of  modalities of  being. The modal 
laws are nothing other than laws of  cosmic time or, as Dooyeweerd puts it, 
“orders of  time.” Every aspect of  reality is characterized by a typical time-
law. Dooyeweerd discerns fifteen different time-laws as temporal aspects of  
reality:50
-numerical
-spatial
-kinematic
-energetic (physicochemical relations of  
empirical reality)
-biotic
-psychic (feeling/sensation)
-logical (analytic manner of  distinction 
lying at the foundation of  all concepts 
and logical judgments)
-historical (experience of  the cultural   
manner of  the development of  social 
life)
-linguistic (symbolic signification)
-social
-economic
-aesthetic
-juridical
-moral
-faith 
In “Het tijdprobleem in de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee” (the problem of  
time in the philosophy of  the law-idea), Dooyeweerd explains his understanding 
and interpretation of  time, detailing how every modal-law-sphere is a temporal 
order. Time expresses itself  in different ways through the modal aspects. 
These aspects differ from each other in the ways they manifest themselves 
in time. For example, in numeric modality the order of  numbers is to be 
understood in the temporal order of  earlier and later numbers; in kinematic 
modality, time expresses itself  as an order of  succession of  movement; in 
biotic modality, time is revealed through the  order of  the development of  
organic life (e.g., birth, maturing, becoming older, dying); in logical modality, 
item-order is expressed, for example, through the logical prius and posterius. 
The sovereignty of  a modality is identified by its zinkern (meaning-kernel) and 
Presbyterian and Reformed, 1958).
49Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 10-11.
50These orders of  cosmic time are relating themselves in an anticipatory and 
retrocipatory temporal order of  analogies. For the sake of  this article series, it is not 
necessary to explain this any further. An introductory explanation can be found in 
Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 76-78.
21inveStiGatinG the preSuppOSitiOnal realm . . . , part i
its wetskring  (circle of  law).51 The zinkern (meaning-kernel) refers to the central 
identity of  a single modality. In the case of  numeric modality, this would be 
the “discrete quantiteit,” which means that any particular thing can also be 
described by focusing on the aspect of  its countability.52 The modal meaning-
kernel of  every aspect guarantees the irreducibility of  the specific modality.53
Besides the modal meaning-kernel, any modality can be characterized by 
its wetskring (circle of  laws). The modal-specific circle of  laws is an expression 
of  the modal meaning-kernel. In the case of  the numeric modal meaning-
kernel of  “countability,” the numeric circle of  laws finds expression in the 
laws of  addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.54 The different 
modal laws refer “backward” and “forward” to other modal laws. In the same 
way, the spatial aspect refers back to the numeric aspect since there is no space 
without the modality of  “more and less.” On the other side, the spatial aspect 
refers forward to the kinematic aspect since it is through movement that this 
aspect exists.55 Thus all laws unite in their basic characteristic of  referring and 
expressing to one another.
In order to better understand Dooyeweerd’s differentiation between 
naïve and theoretical thinking in his analysis of  the structure of  philosophical 
and theoretical thinking, it is necessary to introduce another concept. In the 
Dooyeweerdian view, everything that is created is subject to modal law. However, 
the ways in which created things are subjected to modal law differ extensively. 
To prevent a disproportionate introduction into Dooyeweerd’s thing-structures, 
I will discuss only two relevant terms: subject-function and object-function.
What is meant by thing-structures is that all things have all modal aspects, 
either as subject or as object.56 For example, water does not have a subject-
function, but it does have an object-function in its biotic aspect. That is, water 
does not live, but is needed for the life of  other created things and beings. 
Consequently, plants and water relate to each other in their biotic aspect in 
the form of  a subject-object relation. A stone can serve as another example. 
A stone does not have a subject-function in its linguistic aspect since it cannot 
speak, but it does have an object-function in this specific modality because 
one can speak about it. The stone’s linguistic object-function is only activated 
if  it stands in relation with the linguistic subject-function of  another entity. 
A subject-subject relation is also possible when two things have one or more 
subject-functions in specific modalities in common. For example, when two 
human beings communicate with each other, there will be a subject-subject 
relation within their linguistic modality.
According to the modal theory, time embraces and penetrates all reality. 
Being is always being in time and is always full temporal being. Within 
51Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 9.
52Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 75.
53Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 9.
54Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 76.
55Ibid., 76-80.
56Ibid., 83-84.
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creation, nothing transcends the dynamic temporal horizon of  being except 
the supratemporal heart, as I will show. The supratemporal heart transcends 
time, but not creation, as it is itself  created. Time expresses itself  in temporal 
reality in a diversity of  mutually irreducible functions or means of  being. This 
is of  utmost importance if  one wants to understand Dooyeweerd’s critique of  
classical philosophy. To him, even space is a time-category and was mistakenly 
taken for a static-timeless reality, creating a dichotomy between temporal and 
timeless reality.57 To him, creation is characterized as meaning-being, a term 
referring to the radical dependence of  creational being. This dependence can 
be seen on different levels. On the modal level, every law-sphere necessarily 
refers to other law-spheres and all temporal law-spheres to a supratemporal 
central unity.
On the supramodal level, the unity-heart refers to its own origin, as I 
will show. In fact, there is no self-sufficient created-being. Created-being is 
through its dependence on a [non-Greek]58 timeless God. Consequently, 
timelessness and supratemporality should not be confused! Timelessness 
is a characteristic that belongs only to the self-sufficient creator-God. 
Supratemporality exists only within the realm of  creation. Everything that 
exists through God’s creation is meaning-being. Meaning-being, on one hand, 
is relative being because it expresses a radical dependence on the creator. 
On the other hand, the relativity of  meaning-being is expressed through its 
interdependent relationship with the rest of  creation that is subject to the 
same law.59 This radical character of  creation’s dependence on the creator is 
also referred to by the term “concentric law.”60 The law, then, is the absolute 
boundary between God and his creation, and the origin of  the law is God’s 
sovereign creative will.61
1.2.4 Coherence and Unity—Time and the I
In Dooyeweerd’s thinking, there are at least two elements that contribute to 
human naïve experience as an experience of  inner coherence. On one hand, 
we have the many analogical moments that time makes possible and which 
enable us to experience modal diversity not as antithetical diversity, but as a 
diversity of  coherence. The modal aspects are the simultaneous Seinsweisen 
of  a thing.62 On the other hand, the experience of  this diversity within inner 
57Dooyeweerd, “Het Tijdsprobleem in De Wijsbegeerte Der Wetsidee,” 167.
58Since Dooyeweerd’s conception of  the timelessness of  God is explained as 
being different from the Greek-Aristotelian understanding of  timelessness (cf. n. 
47), I will from here on refer to Dooyeweerd’s timelessness of  God as [non-Greek] 
timelessness in order to prevent confusion. See here Glanz, 20, n. 35.
59Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 4.
60Ibid., 12.
61Choi, 17.
62Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 6.
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coherence refers necessarily to a basic unity as central totality.63 This experience 
of  unity is made possible through the self  or the human heart that is created 
with the ability to bring the inner coherence of  temporal modal diversity to a 
supratemporal unity. This is of  crucial importance to understand.
Humanity was created in the image of  God as an expression of  the unity 
of  the creator. The human self, then, is of  supratemporal character since it 
makes humanity’s unity-experience of  the temporal modal aspect problematic 
and reductionistic.64 Humanity’s unity-self, however, receives its unity-ability 
only through God’s creating man and woman as imago dei.65 Thus the unity-
self  is not independent but dependent and, therefore, refers not only to 
the unity of  the creator, but to the expression of  the unity of  the creator 
who is beyond created temporality and created supratemporality. Thus the 
supratemporal self-unity is dependent on and refers to the timeless unity of  
God. Further, it is within the creational order of  time, which is broken into a 
diversity of  time-aspects that stand in an indissoluble interrelationship. In this 
interrelationship, every aspect refers within and beyond itself  to all the others. 
The temporal coherence, then, refers to a supratemporal unity, which, in turn, 
refers to the timeless unity of  the creator God.
1.2.5 The I and Living
To briefly summarize, all being is temporal being and all being is expressing and 
living the whole temporal order of  reality. It is only humanity that can transcend 
this temporal order through the self  by expressing through its supratemproal 
unity-self  the timeless divine unity-creator. Although Dooyeweerd does not 
seem to elaborate more on what he understands by the timelessness of  God, 
he stresses that he does not have the Greek-Parmenidean idea of  timelessness 
in mind.66 This step from time to supratemporality should not be understood 
as creating a similar dichotomy as form and matter. To Dooyeweerd, the 
being of  things is not matter, but the real thing as it is in time. Also to him, 
the relation between the temporal thing and its timeless creator is not a 
relation through which a phenomenon is pointing to the thing in itself, but is 
a necessary relation of  a thing in itself  that points to its creator.
As mentioned before, it is because of  the created supratemporal 
characteristic of  the self  that the I which lives within temporal reality cannot 
be identified with a modal aspect. The I cannot be reduced toward a biological, 
psychological, or rational I. Therefore, the idea of  cogito ergo sum is a fundamental 
misconception that identifies the I with a single temporal-order and forgets 
that rational thinking is an act of  a human I. The I is the subject of  any human 
temporal action. It is through the supramodal characteristic of  the self  that 
its acts and experiences are taking place within an inner coherence and unity. 
In contrast to the cogito ergo sum idea, the ego is expressing a meaning-totality, 
63Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 4.
64Dooyeweerd uses the terms “self,” “heart,” and “I” interchangeably.
65Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 4.
66Cf. n. 47.
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i.e., a “totality in the coherence of  all its functions within all the modal aspects 
of  cosmic reality.”67 But this meaning-totality itself  is meaning and therefore 
created. Meaning, however, has the universal structure of  referring and 
expressing (as the central law of  meaning). Every thing that has meaning is 
referring to and to a certain extent expressing something else within creation 
but also beyond creation, hinting to the origin of  creation itself. This necessary 
ontic dependence is referred to as concentric law. In the heart’s dependence on 
the divine creator-unity it can find its identity; in the relation with its temporal 
acts and experiences the self  can realize its identity within as an identity of  
freedom and responsibility that is made possible through its imago dei—being as 
an expression of  the being of  God as meaning-totality. The self  is through this 
radical dependence on the creator God experiencing the call to responsibility 
and through its relation with the diversity of  temporal-order it is experiencing 
the limited focus and field of  its responsibility.
In order to understand the relation of  responsibility of  the self  toward 
the modal diversity, it is necessary to return to the architecture of  a single 
modality.
Cosmic time is to be understood as having a cosmonomic and a factual 
side.68 The cosmonomic represents the time-order, while the factual side 
represents the duration of  time-order as an activation of  temporal order.69 
What is meant by this is that the cosmonomic side as time-order is referring 
to all the different modal meaning-kernels that are expressed in the form of  
the different modal wetskringen (circles of  laws). The factual side refers to the 
specific living out of  the modal laws as time-order by a thing or individual. 
Any thing or individual is subject to the time-order and creates through this 
subject-being an individual expression of  the modal laws it is bound to. For 
example, the biological time-order of  birth, maturing, adulthood, aging, and 
dying will find different expression in different subjects. The law-side of  
reality as time-order does not exist outside of  being, but only as a Seinsweise 
(manner of  being) of  a subjective being. In reality, there is no time-order 
without time-duration, no law-side without a subject; the one cannot exist 
without the other.70 This interrelation expresses creational reality. Without the 
subjective being of  things the modal-laws would not exist. The time-order, 
then, is an order that has potentiality. In the realization of  this potentiality 
within individual things or human beings, this potentiality becomes duration 
and actuality.71 The result of  this theoretical insight is that the opposition 
between rationalistic and irrationalistic conceptions can no longer be upheld. 
The cosmonomic side cannot be understood apart from its different individual 
expressions within the factual side. In this sense, the being of  a thing or 
individual is always the factual actualization of  the cosmonomic side of  any 
67Ibid.
68Ibid., 28.
69Dooyeweerd, “Het Tijdsprobleem in de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee,” 194.
70Ibid., 195-196.
71Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 105.
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aspect. Any absolutization of  the cosmonomic side will result in the loss of  
human responsibility, as any absolutization of  the factual side will result in a 
loss of  normativity. Since both responsibility and normativity belong to the 
structural data of  our naïve experience, this theory claims to do justice to this 
universal datum.
Because of  the two sides of  created cosmic time (cosmonomic and 
factual), expressed through all modal aspects, and because of  the need of  
positivization of  the modal norms as a call that is addressing the supramodal 
self, the self  can, within the boundaries of  the norm-structure, freely decide 
how it wants to respond. Humans are not free in the sense of  whether they 
should respond, but free in the sense of  how they will respond.72 As such, the 
relation between the self  and the modal diversity of  reality is not a deterministic 
one, but characterized by responsibility.73 Within the realm of  the modalities 
that have normative time-orders, the self  will creatively respond to them in 
either positivizing them in a faithful direction toward the meaning of  the imago 
dei or with an unfaithful direction away from God. The normative creational 
modal structure of  reality is the “universally valid determination and limitation 
of  the individual subjectivity which is responsibly subject to it.”74 The self ’s 
relation to its creator as imago dei enables the awareness of  its call to individually, 
creatively and in a faithful manner disclose the potentiality in created reality. The 
self  can realize its identity fully and only in temporal reality when it transcends 
it. As Viktor Frankl puts it: “Nur Existenz, die sich selbst transzendiet, kann 
sich selbst verwirklichen” (Only existence, which transcends itself  can come to 
self  realization.)75 In regard to theoretical and philosophical thinking, the self  
only does justice to the imago dei as it develops a view of  reality that allows for 
a concept that does not absolutize anything within the structural datum. To be 
able to do this, the self  needs to acknowledge that of  which it is an image as the 
truly absolute origin of  any meaning-being.
1.2.6 The Logical Modal Aspect
As we have seen, the logical aspect is considered to be one aspect of  reality, 
one Seinsweise of  being that is lived through the self  and is not to be identified 
with the self. Dooyeweerd describes the zinkern of  the logical modal aspect 
as the “analytic mode of  distinction.”76 Making distinctions as qualifying 
characteristic of  any act of  analysis and conceptualization is one of  the many 
modal ways of  human being.77 Dooyeweerd distinguishes between two attitudes 
72To Dooyeweerd, positivization is still on the law-side, while the specific living 
out of  the positivization is placed on the subject-side.
73Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 87-88.
74Choi, 13.
75Viktor Emil Frankl, Der Mensch vor der Frage nach dem Sinn: Eine Auswahl aus dem 
Gesamtwerk, Neuausg. ed. (Munich: Piper, 1998), 225.
76Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 2: 118.
77The analytic mode of  distinction finds its technical expression in the principium\
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of  thought, i.e., naïve thought and theoretical thought. Logical distinction can 
take place in a naïve attitude of  thinking as well as in a theoretical attitude of  
thinking. The difference between these two is that in our naïve attitude we 
distinguish entities and things as a whole, while in our theoretical or scientific 
attitude we make distinctions within entities by abstracting the modalities in 
which they function. Thus in the naïve attitude we do not isolate the thing’s 
ways of  being, i.e., the modalities from the thing itself, but leave them in their 
inner coherence as belonging inseparably to the thing under observation. We 
can recognize the different ways of  being but these ways are still experienced 
as characteristics that belong to the thing that exhibits them.
By the abstract attitude of  theoretical thinking, we isolate a single way 
of  the being of  a thing, i.e., one of  its modal aspects, and focus our “analytic 
eye” on one characteristic itself. We thus theoretically separate a nonlogical 
modality from a thing. Therefore, contrary to the naïve state of  experience 
where the modal diversity is experienced in an intermodal cosmic coherence, 
in which no single aspect is experienced in singularity,78 theoretical thinking 
by its analytic activity of  distinction brings the modal diversity of  temporal 
reality to a distinct consciousness. The modal diversity is made explicit and 
the modal nonlogical aspect that functions as the object of  the theoretical 
thought-act is theoretically disconnected from the intermodal coherence 
in which it is experienced in the naïve state of  living as it is given in the 
structural data. The theoretical attitude of  thought thus breaks the intermodal 
coherence into many possible antithetical relations in which the nonlogical 
modality in focus is functioning as the Gegenstand of  the logical aspect. The 
English translation of  the German term Gegenstand would be “standing in 
opposition.” The Gegenstand as object of  theoretical thinking contrasts the 
object of  our naïve thinking.79
In Dooyeweerdian terminology the relations that we experience in the 
naïve state are subject-object relations (or subject-subject relations),80 while 
the relations that we experience in our theoretical thought-act are Gegenstand-
relations.81
The basic understanding of  the logical aspect will give us enough 
background to enter Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique.
dentitatis, principium exludendae contradictionis, and principium exclusi tertii. Cf. Woudenberg, 
Gelovend Denken, 89.
78Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 3.
79Gegenstand is used “by Dooyeweerd as a technical term for a modality when 
abstracted from the coherence of  time and opposed to the analytic function in the 
THEORETICAL attitude of  thought, thereby establishing the ‘Gegenstand relation.’ 
‘Gegenstand’ is therefore the technical precise word for the object of  SCIENCE, while 
‘object’ itself  is reserved for the objects of  NAÏVE EXPERIENCE” (Kalsbeek, 
Zylstra, and Zylstra, 348).
80Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 14-16.
81Choi, 44.
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1.2.7 Summary82
Through the lens of  his modal theory Dooyeweerd finds nothing in created 
reality that is by nature independent or self-sufficient. Rather, he stresses that 
every single aspect of  reality is dependent on every other aspect of  reality 
and that, in the end, all of  reality is dependent on the creator. Through these 
dependence structures, explained as different time-orders, reality is lived as 
meaningful in its being in time. 
The modal theory, here only briefly covered, can however not fully account 
for the diversity of  human judgments that goes beyond the modal diversity 
of  a thing that is experienced. It does not account for the different theoretical 
conceptions of  reality resulting from different abstract interpretations of  the 
structural datum. There is more to the diversity of  interpretations than the 
diversity of  modal aspects. Man can, with different attitudes, choose different 
modal perspectives. Having said this, the next section will give a description 
of  Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique of  theoretical thought.
1.3 Theoretical Thinking and Its 
Religious Presuppositions
Dooyeweerd states that the great turning point in his philosophical thinking 
was his discovery that thinking itself  necessarily has a religious root. The 
validity of  this conclusion can be shown by two ways of  argumentation. The 
differences of  the two ways stem from the direction they take in order to 
come to the same conclusion. The first way starts from an anlysis of  the 
nature of  philosophy. The second way starts from the inner structure of  the 
theoretical thought-act as the actualization of  the logical aspect of  temporal 
reality on its abstract, nonnaïve level. Both ways end up with the enigmatic 
question: what is the identity of  the self  that philosophizes and that involves 
itself  in theoretical thinking? Both ways of  critique target the question of  
what the self  brings into its thought-act as determining factor in the process 
of  conceptualization. Dooyeweerd tries to show that the conceptualization 
of  the modal diversity of  the structural datum (as a result of  theoretical 
thinking) necessarily involves the religious identity of  the self.
Because both ways are assuming an influential difference between 
philosophical/theoretical thinking and naïve thinking, without which the inner 
structure of  thought cannot be understood, first the present differentiation 
that was already introduced in 1.2.6 will be elaborated. After that the second 
way of  Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique will be presented.
1.3.1 General Characteristic of  Theoretical 
Thinking versus Naïve Thinking
In order to understand Dooyeweerd’s distinction between theoretical thinking 
and naïve thinking, one needs to keep in mind the general modal diversity 
with its analogical relations and specifically the meaning of  the analytic modal 
aspect.
82Cf. Glanz, 27.
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The logical aspect, as the seventh aspect of  the fifteen modal aspects, is 
the first aspect which is different from the earlier six aspects with regards to 
human action, in two ways: 
1. The modal zinkern (modal kernel) contains specific norms and not 
laws in its wetskring (circle of  laws). The difference is that the time-orders of  
these normative aspects, represented by the zinkern, can be violated. They 
function therefore much more as an appeal to the human freedom to live 
responsibly, to be recognized, and applied positively. Thus, in living out 
these norm-modalities we can choose to live them out in a responsible way. 
Here the theoretical distinction between normbeginsel (norm-principle) as the 
cosmonomic side and normpositiviering (norm-positivization) as the factual 
side of  time reappears. There are many different positivizations of  norms 
possible without transgressing or violating the norm. These modal norms are 
therefore not only appealing towards the human freedom for responsibility 
but are also an appeal to the human creativity to choose one positivization 
out of  many good positivizations of  the potentiality of  the cosmonomic side 
belonging to all of  reality.
2. Man is the only creature that has subject functions in the modal 
aspects seventh to fifteenth. This underlines what has been said above, that 
the norms of  the zinkern are appeals to human responsibility and creativity. 
Human beings are by creation subject to these norms and therefore called to 
positivize them.
In order to prepare the explanation of  how man’s responsibility comes to 
the fore in his theoretical thought-acts, one needs to understand the difference 
between the theoretical and naïve attitudes of  analytic distinction.
Contrary to theoretical abstraction, naïve experience, or so-called 
“common sense” experience, lacks any antithetical modal constructions. In 
the naïve state, man experiences concrete things not in a theoretic-synthesized 
but in a systatical way.83 Derived from the Greek sustasij/sunisthmi (in 
contrast to ekstasij/ecisthmi), systase means “staying conjoint with each 
other” or “staying united.” The reason why we experience the temporal 
continuity of  things in our naivety in a systatical way is theoretically explained 
by the subject-object relation in which all the different modal aspects relate to 
all the different modal aspects of  the thing/event experienced. These modal 
relations can either take the form of  a subject-object relation or a subject-
subject relation.84 In the integral cosmic coherence, things cannot exist by 
themselves but are dependent on other things for the realization of  their 
subject or object functions.
1.3.2 Transcendental Critique85
Dooyeweerd argues in the second way from what the ego does when it is 
thinking theoretically. Thus the structure of  the theoretical thought-act is the 
83Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken, 128.
84Cf. Glanz, 32.
85For the first way, see ibid., 32-28.
29inveStiGatinG the preSuppOSitiOnal realm . . . , part i
focus of  the second way. Dooyeweerd argues that theoretical thought, in order 
to be able to conceptualize the inner coherence of  the structural datum, is 
structurally in need of  a self  that brings in a religious decision that functions 
as a starting point beyond the Gegenstand-relation.
When Dooyeweerd looks at the inner structure of  theoretical thinking, 
he uncovers three universal problematic characteristics of  abstract thinking. 
The universal characteristics of  any theoretical thought-act are abstraction, 
synthesis and the necessity of  critical self-reflection.
1.3.2.1 The First Problematic Characteristic: 
The Gegenstand-Relation
The first characteristic of  theoretical thought is the abstraction of  the 
subject-object and subject-subject relations of  naïve experience into different 
Gegenstand-relations. Thus, this first problem refers back to a previously 
mentioned distinction between the theoretical and pretheoretical attitudes of  
the ego.
In the critical inquiry into the inner structure of  theoretical thought, 
we see that modal aspects are intentionally and theoretically uprooted from 
their temporal coherence into antithetical relations and the logical aspect 
relates antithetically to the nonlogical aspect under investigation. Without 
this abstract attitude, the modal diversity of  temporal reality could not be 
discovered with distinctivieness, for the subject-object relations do not 
experience an antithetical modal diversity of  temporal reality within the 
pretheoretical attitude.86
It is important to notice that theoretical abstraction is not understood 
as abstracting reality from time. Theoretical abstraction only abstracts 
intentionally from the temporal coherence but not from temporal diversity. 
Since theoretical thought cannot transcend the realm of  temporality, it remains 
not only in the realm of  diversity but also within the realm of  coherence. The 
inner coherence of  the modal diversity belongs to the creational order from 
which the self  cannot detach its theoretical thinking. Theoretical thinking 
therefore necessarily involves all modal aspects. As any other act, man’s 
theoretical acting has a psychic, biological, aesthetic, etc. aspect. Consequently, 
the antithetical situation that the logical aspect enforces between all modalities 
and between its own modal structure and the Gegenstand is not a real, i.e., an 
ontic, but a theoretical, i.e., a specific epistemic, problem. This is testified to 
by the resistance the Gegenstand displays when one attempts to conceptualize 
it in logical terms.87 This resistance necessarily evolves, because the logically 
qualified concept of  the Gegenstand cannot account for its nonlogical modality 
that is not logically qualified. The different modal nonlogical analogies are 
even present when a modality is abstracted into a Gegenstand. The abstracted 
modal aspect (Gegenstand) expresses its ontic coherence with all other aspects 
86See Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 42-43.
87Ibid., 39-40.
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through the cosmic temporal coherence (expressed in analogical moments; cf. 
1.2.3/4) from which theoretical thought intentionally tries to abstract.
The basic question that arises from the first problematic characteristic 
in regard to the act of  theoretical thinking is: what is the meaning of  the 
continuous bond of  coherence in the diversity of  modalities that we cannot 
grasp through theoretical thought? This question cannot be answered because 
the real coherence is lost through intentional abstraction at the very moment 
one takes a theoretical attitude. Thus, in our theoretical attitude we lose the 
inner coherence that we are searching for.88 Theoretical thought cannot 
autonomously establish a concept of  modal coherence without having an idea 
of  coherence that goes beyond theoretical thinking itself. With this in mind, 
one can understand why Dooyeweerd cannot accept the philosophical dogma 
of  the autonomy of  theoretical thought, that pretends to penetrate reality as 
it is by means of  theoretical thought.
1.3.2.2 The Second Problematic Characteristic: 
The Search for Synthesis
If  it is the aim of  abstract thinking to form a theoretical concept of  the 
pretheoretical datum, and this datum cannot be conceptualized without 
losing its coherence, how then can an explicit and theoretical formulation of  
the implicitly, naïvely experienced coherence be possible? The first problem 
addressed in the transcendental critique automatically leads to the second.
In order to be able to formulate a concept that does not defeat the 
coherence of  the pretheoretical datum, one must have an idea as reference 
point that goes beyond the logical opposition and theoretical thought as a 
whole, and can thereby direct the process of  theoretical thinking. This idea 
can allow for the possibility to theoretically formulate the inner coherence 
of  reality as theoretical synthesis. It can function as a point of  central unity 
that theoretically relates the modal aspects that were dissociated. We need a 
transcendent reference point from which we can receive an idea of  such a 
central unity. To defend the dogma of  the neutrality of  theoretical thought, 
it is necessary to find this central reference point for theoretical synthesis 
within the Gegenstand-relation. The modal theory, however, has shown this 
to be impossible, for the Gegenstand-relation “offers in itself  no bridge 
between the logical thought-aspect and its nonlogical ‘Gegenstand.’”89 If  
the central reference point is sought in the Gegenstand-relation, it will lead to 
the absolutization of  a specific modal meaning-kernel and reduce all other 
modalities to subcategories of  the Gegenstand-relation.90 It will cut all the 
lines of  temporal coherence of  the other modalities and will merely allow 
the analogical moments of  the particular Gegenstand. If  this takes place, there 
are as many possible theoretical syntheses as there are Gegenstand-relations. 
The theoretical syntheses that flow from the dogma of  the neutrality of  
88Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 12.
89Dooyeweerd, A New Criticsm of  Theoretical Thought, 45.
90Cf. Glanz, 41, n. 101.
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theoretical thought lead to multiple types of  reductionisms (biologism, 
physicism, historicism . . . ). These types can be encountered in modern 
science and philosophy.91 To Dooyeweerd this multitude of  reductionisms 
proves that they are not results of  theoretical thought itself  but testify to 
the possibility of  different supratheoretical decisions that are brought in by 
the thinking I. By the structure of  theoretical thought, the starting point for 
theoretical thought cannot be found in thought itself, but most come from a 
supratheoretical decision of  the thinking I. This decision, which is basically a 
religious one, will determine the outcome of  the theoretical synthesis.92
How then can one find a supratemporal reference point that transcends 
the theoretical antithesis in such a way that the act of  theoretical synthesis 
takes a direction that does justice to the structural datum? In asking this 
question, one is searching for a starting point that offers a total view on 
reality and is a necessity for any scientific thought at the moment it involves 
itself  in synthetical thinking. This leads to the last problem in our theoretical 
thought-action. The self  as the subject of  all thinking activity is reflecting 
about itself.
1.3.2.3 The Third Problematic Characteristic: 
The Need of  Self-reflection
Since a reference point for synthesis cannot be found in any law-structure 
of  a single modality, unless one thinks reductionistically, the search for 
a supramodal starting point leads to that which guarantees the experience 
of  the diversity-coherence: the modal-transcendent self. Structurally seen, 
theoretical thought is in need of  a self  that chooses a starting point that in 
turn makes theoretical synthesis possible. How can you get to the self, how to 
become aware of  the self, and what actually is the self ?
The question cannot be answered without self-knowledge. But how can 
you know yourself  when a concept of  the transcendent self  is impossible? 
How can you arrive at self-knowledge when true self-reflection cannot be of  
theoretical character?
Biblically seen, the mystery of  the central human ego is that it is nothing 
in itself. The central ego cannot be found in the modal diversity. In fact, 
as “soon as I try to grasp the I in a philosophical concept it recedes as a 
phantom and dissolves itself  into nothingness. It cannot be determined by 
any modal aspect of  our experience, since it is the central reference-point to 
which all fundamental modes of  our temporal experience are related.”93 If  
the transcendent self  is intrinsically dependent, in which dependence relation 
can the I come to self-understanding? Is it the human I-thou relation, where 
we only seem to understand that our selfhood is nothing without the other?94 
Dooyeweerd answers in the negative, as this relation is as unable to come to 
91Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” 51.
92Choi, 53.
93Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 25.
94Ibid., 28.
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self-realization as our relation to the temporal horizon of  its experience. The 
reason for this is that the encounter with the thou confronts us with the same 
mystery as our own selfhood.95
Clearly seen in the first way, the self  necessarily needs to find its origin 
through its participation in the Archimedean standpoint, if  it wants to be able 
to give its thought-acts a direction towards totality. Within the Archimedean 
standpoint the self  comes to an understanding of  the origin of  its being and 
meaning. Because of  the inner structure of  theoretical thought, an ultimate 
idea of  origin, also called “God,” necessarily needs to be chosen.96 True self-
knowledge is therefore dependent on the knowledge of  God; understanding 
of  man is dependent upon the understanding of  God. This understanding is 
generated through the relationship of  the transcendent self  with the divine 
creator, in whose image man is created, and who reveals himself  through 
the words of  the prophets within the human heart. This supratemporal self-
identity penetrates all temporal activity and being of  man in his experience 
and understanding, and allows man to engage in true theoretical synthesis in 
both science and philosophy.97 Only by the understanding of  the sovereignty 
of  the true God, all idols (absolutizations of  created parts) are excluded and 
all aspects of  creation are taken as creation and not as gods. In contrast to real 
self-understanding, the transcendent self  that does not truly understand itself  
always fails in its attempt to create a nonreductionist theoretical synthesis 
because of  its reductionistic starting point.
To summarize, theoretical thought, seen structurally, needs a starting-
point. The self  will either find its true origin or will search for an idol that 
replaces the true origin. Idolization leads to a reductionistic concept of  the 
totality of  meaning, which in turn raises dualistic tensions, as the structural 
datum does not allow for any type of  reductionism.98
1.3.3 The Religious Ground-motive
Both ways of  the transcendental critique of  theoretical thought reveal the 
necessity of  a supratemporal starting point. The supratemporal starting point 
supplies the self  with the answers to the three supratemporal questions of  
philosophical thought. The need for these transcendental ideas (idea of  
coherence, unity, and origin) was revealed through the different theoretical 
thought-act problems that belong to the universal structure of  theoretical 
thought. Dooyeweerd includes all the three transcendental ideas in the so-called 
cosmonomic idea. The first idea concerns the modal coherence-diversity. It is 
the transcendental idea of  the whole of  our temporal horizon of  experience 
with its diversity of  modal aspects and their mutual interrelations. The second 
idea concerns the central unity. It is referred to by the idea of  coherence 
as that which guarantees the unitary totality of  the coherence-diversity. The 
95Ibid., 29.
96Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 55.
97Ibid., 472.
98Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 31.
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third idea concerns the origin of  the totality of  meaning. It relates all that is 
relative to the absolute and relates man as imago dei to the deus.
All three ideas are transcendental in character, for they spring not from 
the temporal diversity nor the transcendent self. They are instead provided by 
the religious ground-motive or man’s religion.99 This ground-motive functions 
as a dynamis that keeps a religious community together. The “religious ground-
motive is the central mainspring of  the entire attitude of  life and thought”100 
and the condition for the specific content of  the three transcendental 
ideas that express the starting point for any theoretical action. Because the 
transcendental ideas are required by the nature of  theoretical thought, it is by 
means of  the religious ground-motive that philosophical thought is controlled 
and a basic framework of  interpretation created.
According to Dooyeweerd, every untrue religious ground-motive is of  
dialectical nature. “Dialectic” here means that there are two absolutizations of  
something creational that contrast irrevocably with other aspects of  creation. 
The result of  this dialectical antithesis is that the theoretical synthesis that 
is produced under its influence has many irreconcilable tensions and always 
lacks real unity. The source of  the absolutizations of  two creational aspects is 
to be found in the dogma of  the autonomy of  reason. This dogma motivates 
man in his theoretical pursuit to search for unity and coherence in aspects 
of  temporal reality. The absolutization of  a specific Gegenstand-relation 
automatically forces another modal aspect (functioning opposition) into a 
divinization, to battle its reduced status as mere subcategory. Dooyeweerd 
describes this process when he says “any idol that has been created by the 
absolutization of  a modal aspect evokes its counter idol.”101 The reason for 
such a “counter-divinization” is that the modal diversity is characterized by 
an indissoluble interrelation in which all modal aspects are relative. They 
relate analogically and not genetically to each other on the basis of  their 
sphere sovereignty. Only the biblical religious ground-motive can provide an 
“undialectical” starting point, as it warns against any absolutization of  the 
relative-creational.
1.3.4 Summary
We have seen by means of  the second way of  the transcendental critique 
that neither philosophical nor theoretical thought by its very inner structure 
can be autonomous, but necessarily demands a religious starting point of  
supramodal or supratheoretical character. Any religious starting point 
that is chosen, whether it is of  real supramodal character or expressed in 
a Gegenstand-relation, structurally functions as supramodal and determines 
theoretical synthetical conceptions by directing the ideas of  coherence, 
unity, and origin. In both ways of  the transcendental critique, the need of  
a theoretical synthesis is the crux of  philosophical thinking generally and 
99Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” 52.
100Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of  Theoretical Thought, 63.
101Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of  Western Thought, 37.
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theoretical thought specifically. Thus, philosophical and scientific thought 
cannot be absolute, but is fallible like every other human activity. Only the 
origin of  creation has an independence-status that can be considered truly 
absolute.102 The religious starting point of  man’s thinking is delivered in the 
revelation of  the creator God, which leads our fallible human activity to come 
to increasingly understand the meaning of  relative reality.
It is the dogmatic view of  the neutrality of  theoretical thought that turned 
fallible and relative human activity into something absolute and consequently 
leads to exclusivistic, reductionistic ideas.
One needs to keep in mind, however, that with the discovery of  the 
nonneutrality of  abstract rational thinking, rational normativity was not lost. 
Rational thinking is through the normative principles of  the logical modal 
aspect of  universal normative character. At the same time it is also relative.
1.4 Conclusion
For our reflection on methodology within biblical theology, Dooyeweerd’s 
analysis is impacting. Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique of  thought 
triggers the question to what extent the exegetical methodologies developed 
so far are influenced by transcendental ideas that absolutize one modal aspect 
of  created reality. Is the unity and coherence of  the writings of  Holy Scripture 
not often sought in a wetskring of  a specific modal kernel?
Let me give two examples that seem to affirm the latter question: 
1. The depth-psychological approach of  biblical exegesis tries to explain 
the value and truth of  the biblical writings exclusively from the viewpoint of  
the Freudian principle of  “individuation” and other related perspectives. For 
theologians like the well-known Eugen Drewermann, exegesis is performed 
in complete analogy to Traumdeutung as basically developed by Freud and 
Jung.103 Biblical narratives and teachings are therefore primarily seen as the 
objectification of  complex inner psychological processes which are to be 
decoded. Thus, the origin and motivation for the development of  biblical/
religious texts is located in the psychological wetskring of  the complex process 
of  man’s self-discovery. Such argument results from the absolutization of  the 
psychic modality.
2. Sociohistorical methodology (cf. Albertz, Lemche, Crüsemann, 
Schottroff  and others) attempts to find the coherence and origin of  biblical 
texts as of  crucial methodological importance.104 As consequence, the history 
of  religion is made equivalent to the history of  socioeconomic development. 
Thus, biblical descriptions of  God’s intervention in human history are easily 
reduced to interests of  specific social classes. This type of  exegesis results 
from the absolutization of  the economic or social modality.
As Dooyeweerd pointed out, theoretical thinking runs the risk of  
absolutizing an aspect of  created being. The laws of  creational aspects can 
102Ibid., 54.
103Oeming, 103-104.
104Ibid., 46-51.
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start to deliver the content of  the transcendental ideas, which influence the 
development of  methodologies by which we interpret the world in general 
and biblical texts specifically.
Consequently, Talstra’s call (see “Introduction”) for “order” in regard 
to the plurality of  methodologies is not enough. To move beyond our 
problematic methodological situation, one needs to uncover the transcendental 
ideas that are at work in specific methodologies and give them their proper 
nonautonomous place within the complex activity of  interpretation.
However, this last suggestion cannot be realized without acknowledging 
that human reason is fundamentally dependent on transcendental ideas. 
Dooyeweerd explained that the very dogma of  the autonomy of  reason 
is responsible for the many different and mutually exclusive conceptions 
of  reason. This dogma allowed the many absolutizations of  theoretical 
abstractions to go unrecognized and thus a diversity of  opposing philosophical 
views concerning human experience of  reality were formulated—all of  them 
lacking a truly critical justification. Thus, critical self-reflection for the biblical 
theologian is urgently required if  he wants to receive his transcendental ideas 
from the One who is really autonomous.
These conclusions are drawn in the awareness that Dooyeweerd’s 
argumentation has not yet been critically analyzed. This analysis will be 
featured in the following articles. However, the reader might already sense that 
there are persuasive reasons to appreciate Dooyeweerd’s modal theory and his 
conception of  the nonneutrality of  human thinking to a certain extent, even 
though his line of  argument must also be criticized.
Having introduced Dooyeweerd’s structural analysis of  the theoretical 
thought-act, we are prepared to compare and contrast it with the 
phenomenological structure of  Reason and its biblical interpretation as it is 
presented by Fernando Canale. The understanding of  the phenomenological 
structure of  Reason will help us to set up a critical perspective on Dooyeweerd’s 
understanding of  thought-acts and allow us to provide an even deeper insight 
into the general structure of  human understanding. The second article of  this 
series, then, will introduce the phenomenological structure of  Reason and its 
biblical interpretation.
